NOTES
CURRENT LEGAL ATTACKS ON RACIAL RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS
As interracial tensions have become more acute in the postwar period the
intensity of legal attacks on racial restrictive covenants has also mounted. The
magnitude of the attack is evidenced by the large number of recent cases. z In
the most significant of these, efforts were made to present appropriate social
data to the courts and to focus attention upon the constitutional and policy
issues involved.2 Against this background the Supreme Court has granted
I Swain v. Maxwell, 196 S.W. 2d 78o (Mo., 1946); Vernon v. R. J. Reynolds Realty Co.,
2d 710 (1946); Kraemer v. Shelley, I98 S.W. 2d 679 (Mo., 1946); Perkins
v. Trustees of Monroe Avenue Church of Christ, 7o N.E. 2d 487 (Ohio, 1946); Hurd v. Hodge,
162 F. 2d 233 (App. D.C., i947); Sipes v. McGhee, 25 N.W. 2d 638 (Mich., I947); Northwest
Civic Ass'n v. Sheldon, 27 N.W. 2d 36 (Mich., 1947); Mrsa v. Reynolds, 27 N.W. 2d 40
(Mich., 1947); Schwartz v. Hubbard, 177 P. 2d 1'7 (Okla., 1947); Linder v. Stapp, 178 P. 2d
6,7 (Okla., 1947); Hawkins v. Whayne, 179 P. 2d 138 (Okla., 1947). In addition there have
been a number of cases in the lower courts such as Drury v. Neely, 69 N.Y.S. 2d 677 (N.Y.,
1947) and Kemp v. Rubin, 69 N.Y.S. 2d (N.Y., 1947). There has also been a large amount of
writing on the subject. For example see McGovney, Racial Segregation by State Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants or Conditions in Deeds Is Unconstitutional,
33 Calif. L. Rev. 5 (1945); Kahen, Validity of Anti-Negro Restrictive Covenants, 12 Univ.
Chi. L. Rev. 198 (1945); Hale, Rights under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment
against Injuries Inflicted by Private Individuals, 6 Lawyer's Guild Rev. 627 (1946). Miller,
Race Restrictions on the Use or Sale of Real Property, 2 Nat. B. J. 24 (x944); Miller, Race
Restrictions on Ownership or Occupancy of Land, 7 Lawyer's Guild Rev. 99 (1947); Weaver,
Racial Restrictive Housing Covenants, 30 J.of Land and Public Utility Economics 183 (1944).
Jones, Legality of Race Restrictive Housing Covenants, 4 Nat. Bar J. 14 (1946); Tefft, Marsh
v. Alabama-A Suggestion concerning Racial Restrictive Housing Covenants, 4 Nat. Bar. J.
133 (1946); Martin, Segregation of Residences of Negroes, 32 Mich. L. Rev. 721 (934); Bruce,
Racial Zoning by Private Contract in the Light of the Constitution and the Rule against
Restraint on Alienation, 21 Il1. L. Rev. 704 (1927); Judicial Enforcement of Restrictive
Convenants against Negroes, 40 111. L. Rev. 432 (1946); Anti-Discrimination Legislation and
International Declarations as Evidence of Public Policy against Restrictive Covenants, 13
226 N.C. 58, 36 S.E.

Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 477 (1946).
2In the earlier cases and in most of the recent cases the attacks were narrow in scope. Among
these attacks have been the following: i) The covenant is an unlawful restraint on alienation.
Where the covenant is against selling or otherwise conveying to persons of a particular race,
this attack, which continues to be asserted vigorously, has sometimes been successful. Los
Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 18y Cal. 68o, 186 Pac. 596 (i919); Porter v. Barrett, 233
Mich. 373, 2o6 N.W. 532 (1925); White v. White, 108 W. Va. 128, ISO S.E. 531 (I929); Perkins
v. Trustees of Monroe Avenue Church of Christ, 7o N.E. 2d 487 (Ohio, 1947). But where the
covenant is against use or occupancy the courts give it full effect, thus rendering these decisions
of little or no practical significance. Chandler v. Zeigler, 88 Col. 1, 291 Pac. 822 (193o) and
cases collected in McGovney, Racial Residential Segregation by State Court Enforcement of
Restrictive Agreements, Covenants or Conditions Is Unconstitutional, 33 Calif. L. Rev. 5
(1945); Bowman, The Constitution and Common Law Restraints on Alienation, 8 B.U.L.
Rev. 1 (1928); Bruce, Racial Zoning by Private Contract in the Light of the Constitution and
the Rule against Restraints on Alienation, 21 l1.L. Rev. 704 (1927). 2) The covenant is void
as against public policy. Although this attack is now being amplified, and has met with success
in Canada in the case of In re Drummond Wren, 4 D.L.R. 674 (High Ct. of Ontario, 1945), it
was originally asserted only as part of the restraint on alienation argument and frequently has
been unsuccessful in this limited context. Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625, 188 N.W. 330
(1922); Schulte v. Starks, 238 Mich. 102, 213 N.W. 102 (1927)- 3) The neighborhood restricted
has already been infiltrated by Negroes and therefore it would be inequitable to enforce the
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certiorari'in two cases to review the questions presented-by the judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants. 3 Certiorari has been petitioned for and seems
likely to be granted in two other cases.4
In the first of the cases in which certiorari has been granted, Sipes v. McGhee,s
the Supreme Court of Michigan held a restrictive covenant reading: "This
property shall not be used or occupied by any person or persons except those of
covenant. See Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 584, 10 P. 2d 496 (1932); Pickel v. McCawley,
329 Mo. 166,44 S.W. 2d 857 (i93I); Hundley v. Gorowitz, 132 F. 2d 23 (App. D.C., 1942);
and cases collected in Negro Restrictions and the "Changed Conditions Doctrine," 7 Univ.
Chi. L. Rev. 710 (i94o); Judicial Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants against Negroes, 40
Ill. L. Rev. 432 (1946); 3 Tiffany, Real Property § 871-75 (1920). 4) Although there has been
no change of conditions within the restricted area the immediately surrounding. area has been
so changed as to greatly reduce the value of the property, and therefore the enforcement of the
covenant would be inequitable. This attack has not met with success. Grady v. Garland, 89
F. 2d 817 (App. D.C., 1937), cert. den. 302 U.S. 694 (1937); Vernon v. R. J. Reynolds Realty
Co., 226 N.C. 58, 36 S.E. 2d 710 (1946); Schwartz v. Hubbard, 177 P. 2d 117 (Okla., 1947);
Swain v. Maxwell, 196 S.W. 78o (Mo., 1946); and see Miller, Race Restrictions on the Use or
Sale of Real Property, 2 Nat. Bar J. 24 (1944). 5)The occupancy by Negroes was not such as
to come within the scope of the covenant. Gableman v. Dept. of Conservation, 309 Mich.
416, IS N.W. 2d 689 (I944). Negroes having access to lake for fishing purposes through prop
erty owned by State Department of Conservation do not occupy the property within the
meaning of the recorded restrictions. 6) The particular restrictions were ambiguous and did
not exclude all non-Caucasians even where that effect might have been intended; Kathan v.
Williams, 307 Mich. 219, 15 N.W. 2d 137 (1944) (successful attack); or racial terms themselves are inherently ambiguous. Burkhardt v. Lofton, 63 Calif. App. 2d 230, 146 P. 2d 720
(I944) (unsuccessful attack); Sipes v. McGhee, 25 N.W. 2d 638 (Mich., 1947) (unsuccessful
attack). 7) The effect of a tax-sale deed was to render the restrictions inoperative. Doherty v.
Rice, 240 Wis. 389, 3 N.W. 2d 734 (1942) (successful attack on prohibition against use or occupancy but not the prohibition against alienation); Hawkins v. Whayne, 179 P. 2d X38
(Okla., 1947) (unsuccessful attack). 8) There were insufficient signers to effectuate the agreement, or the agreement was not recorded or was improperly recorded. See Foster v. Stewart,
134 Cal. App. 482, 25 P. 2d 497 (I933); Burke v. Kleiman, 277 Ill. App. 51g (1934); Hansberry
v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (194o); Thornhill v. Herdt, 130 S.W. 2d i75 (Mo., 1939); Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W. 2d 679 (Mo., 1946); and see Richardson, Some of the Defenses Available in
Restrictive Covenant Suits against Colored Citizens of St. Louis, 3 Nat. Bar J. 5o ('944).
These objections are generally upheld when they are asserted and proven in a timely manner.
9) The vendor is a subsequent owner, not a party to the original agreement. The courts do
not appear to have given any effect to this distinction. Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F. 2d 233 (App.
D.C., 1947); and cases cited therein. io) There was no evidence defendants were not of the
Caucasian race. Sipes v. McGhee, 25 N.W. 2d 638 (Mich., 1947) (not a successful attack where
the contrary was proved). ii)The covenant is repugnant to the fee. This has also been an unsuccessful attack. Chandler v. Zeigler, 88 Col. T, 291 Pac. 822 (I93o); Stewart v. Cronan,
105 Col. 393, 98 P. 2d 999 (1940); and see Martin, Segregation of Residences of Negroes, 32
Mich. L. Rev. 72r, 733 (I934). When Professor McGovney published his article in i945,
op. cit. supra note I,the highest courts of 36 states had not yet passed on the validity of restrictive covenants. The number is now reduced to 35 by the decision of the Ohio Supreme
Court in Perkins v. Trustees of Monroe Avenue Church of Christ, 7o N.E. 2d 487 (Ohio,
1946).

3 Sipes v. McGhee, 25 N.W. 2d 638 (Mich., 1947) cert. granted 15 U.S.L. Week 3478 (1947);
Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W. 2d 679 (Mo., 1946) cert. granted I5 U.S.L. Week 3478 (1947).
4 Hurd v. Hodge, x62 F. 2d 233 (App. D.C., 1947); Perkins v. Trustees of Monroe Avenue Church of Christ, 70 N.E.2d 487 (Ohio, 1946).

S25 N.W. 2d 638 (Mich., 1947), cert.,granted 15 U.S.L. Week 3478 (1947).
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the Caucasian race" 6 valid and enforceable by injunction, basing its decision
on a similar Michigan case decided in 1922.7 The Sipes case is notable for the
form of the policy arguments and for the social data and supplementary legal
arguments presented in the amicus curiae briefs. 8 In the amicus briefs the attempt was made to establish a public policy against racial discrimination by
reference to Michigan statutes outlawing various other forms of racial discrimination,9 by analogy to recent related decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 0 by reference to the United Nations Charter and other international agreements,"" and on broad principles of social welfare with special
6 Ibid.,

at 640.

7Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625, i88 N.W.

330 (1922).

8 Amicus curiae briefs were submitted by the American Jewish Congress (Detroit Section);
Wolverine Bar Association; National Lawyers Guild (Detroit Chapter); United Automobile
Workers (C.I.O.); Ardmore Association; and the National Bar Association.
9Discrimination by state medical institutions, by public educational institutions, and in
places of public amusement and recreation is prohibited. Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, z929)
§ 28.343-45; § r4-845; § 15.76; § r5.38o. Life insurance companies are prohibited from making any discrimination based on race. Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, 1929) § 24.293. A list of
statutes in other jurisdictions prohibiting various forms of racial discrimination is noted in
Anti-Discrimination Legislation and International Declarations as Evidence of Public Policy
against Restrictive Covenants, 13 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 477 (1946). The author of the note
suggests that where a state legislature has outlawed many forms of discrimination, but has
failed to act with regard to the widely publicized problem of restrictive covenants, the better
inference may be that the legislature at least has no policy against such covenants. See Lion's
Head Lake v. Bizezensky, 43 A. 2d 729 (Dist. Ct. N.J., i945); Burkhardt v. Lofton, 63 Cal.
App. 2d 230, 146 P. 2d 720 (i944). In other fields, however, the courts have not been unwilling
to infer a public policy from related statutes. See Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law,
Harvard Legal Essays 213 (1934), and for comment thereon see Anti-Discrimination Legislation and International Declarations as Evidence of Public Policy against Restrictive Covenants, 13 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 477, 481, and Gelhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 Col. L.

Rev. 678 (r935).

1° West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding validity of the minimum
wage law; not deprivation of due process); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (acts
of election officials in altering ballots in state primary election were acts under color of federal
law depriving voters of constitutional rights within the meaning of i8 U.S.C.A. § 52 making
such deprivation a crime); Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1943) (holding exclusion of Negroes
from primary election state action within the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (i944) (certified union must fairly represent the interests of those in the collective bargaining unit, including Negroes); Tunstall v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (state could not furnish legal education for whites
without providing comparable opportunity for Negroes); and see also Betts v. Easley, i61
Kan. 459, i69 P. 2d 831 (1946), noted in 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 492; James v. Marinship Corporation, 25 Cal. 2d 721, i55 P. 2d 329 (i944) (labor union with closed shop contract cannot
maintain a closed union).
u Art. 55c. of the United Nations Charter provides: "The United Nations shall promote
.... uniform respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all,
without distinction as to race, sex, language, and religion." Art. 56 states: "All members pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization for the
achievement of the purposes set forth in Art. 55." The United States also signed the Act of
Chapultepec, undertaking with the Latin American Nations to "prevent with all meanswithin
their power all that may provoke discrimination among individuals because of racial and
religious reasons."
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reference to a recent Canadian case-2 in which a coVenant against Jews was held
void as against public policy. It would seem to represent a measurezof success
for the opponents of covenants that although there was nothing in the record
concerning the wider p61icy arguments, the court thought it necessary to comment on the social data presented in the amicus briefs.3
In reply to the argument that the United Nations Charter makes the device
of restrictive covenants a matter of public concern rather than private contract,
the Michigan court said:
So far as the instant case is concerned these pronouncements are merely indicative of a desirable social trend and an objective devoutly to be desired by all wellthinking peoples. These arguments are predicated upon a plea for justice rather than
4
the application of the settled principles of established law.!
The court considered that it was bound by the earlier decision and refused to
overrule it. s
In the second case in which 'the Supreme Court has granted certiorari,
Kraemer v. Shelley, 6 the Missouri Supreme Court reversed a decree of the
Circuit Court of St. Louis, which had held a covenant against occupancy
unenforceableon the ground that it was the intention of the parties that all the
property within the specified area was to be restricted before the covenant
would operate. Thirty out of thirty-nine owners had signed, five of the nonsigners being Negroes. The Missouri Supreme Court, in reversing, distinguished
Thornhill v. Herdt,17 where it was held that a restrictive covenant designating as
parties all owners of property in the district was invalid unless signed by all.
The court said that the rule in the Thornhill case was applicable only where it
could be shown that the agreement was intended to bind all or none, and since
at the time signatures were sought five of the owners of property in the restricted area were Negroes, it was patent that the signers could not have intended all owners to sign before the covenant was to operate.
The principal case revolved about the narrow question of the intent of the
parties to the covenant. There was no special showing of social data in the
record and consequently the policy issue was disposed of summarily. On the
constitutional question the court was of the novel opinion, although it did not
amplify its meaning, that to construe enforcement of the covenant as "state
action by the state itself in violation of the 14 th Amendment.... would be to
In re Drummond Wren, 4 D.L.R. 674 (High Ct. of Ontario, 1945).
25 N.W. 2d 638, 644 (Mich., 1947). "The arguments based on the factual statement
pertaining to public health, safety, and delinquency are strong and convincing. However, we
must confine our decision to the matters within the record submitted to us and the questions
raised in the briefs of the parties to the cause."
'4 ibid., at 644.
2s Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625, 188 N.W. 330 (1922).
26 198 S.W. 2d 679 (Mo., x946), cert. granted 15 U.S.L. Week 3478 (1947).
13

17 130

S.W. 2d 175 (Mo., 1939).
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deny the parties to such an agreement one of 'the fundamental privileges of
citizenship, access to the courts."18

In the first of the cases in which certiorari has been petitioned for but not yet
granted, Huzrd v. Hodge, 9 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld a perpetual deed covenant against rent, lease, transfer, or conveyance.
The validity of both restrictive deed covenants ° and restrictive covenants expressed in agreements between landowners-l had been upheld by that court on
several occasions. The court, therefore, in a brief opinion, rested its decision on
an earlier case- in which the same area was covered by the covenant. The'court
was of the opinion that no such change of neighborhood had occurred as to
make enforcement inequitable, that the restriction was not an unlawful restraint on alienation, and that all other contentions of the petitioner were
answered by the previous decisions.
The case, however, is notable chiefly for the dissent of Judge Edgerton, who
said:
The covenants are void as unreasonable restraints on alienation. They are void
because contrary to public policy. Their enforcement by injunction is inequitable.
Their enforcement by injunction violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Their enforcement by injunction violates the Civil Rights Act which requires
that "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property." R.S. § 1978, 8 U.S.C.A. § 42.23
He pointed out that the court apparently thought Corriganv. Buckley,24 decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1926, was controlling, but that
there was a big difference between holding that such covenants are not void
under the Constitution and the Civil Rights Act and holding that they are valid
and enforceable by injunction. It has increasingly been insisted that Corriganv.
Buckley is not squarely in point. The argument is that since the Supreme Court
had only held that the petitioner's contentions did not afford a jurisdictional
Isx98 S.W. 2d 679, 683 (Mo., 1946).
9162 F. 2d 233 (App. D.C., 1947).
2lHundley v. Gorewitz, X32 F. 2d 23 (App. D.C., 1942); Torrey v. Wolfes, 6 F. 2d 702
(App. D.C., 1925); Grady v. Garland, 89 F. 2d 817 (App. D.C., 2937), cert. den. 302 U.S. 694
(1937); Cornish v. O'Donoghue, 30 F. 2d 983 (App. D.C., 2929), cert. den. 279 U.S. 87, (I929).
-Corrigan v. Buckley, 299 Fed. 899 (App. D.C., 1926), appeal dismissed 271 U.S. 323
(3926); Mays v. Burgess, 147 F. 2d 869 (App. D.C., 1945), cert. den. 325 U.S. 868 (i945);
Russell v. Wallace, 30 F. 2d 981 (App. D.C., 1929), cert. den. 279 U.S. 871 (1929).

-Mays v. Burgess, 147 F. 2d 869 (App. D.C., 1945), cert. den. 325 U.S. 868 (1945).
3 x62 F. 2d 233, 235 (App. D.C., 1947). Judge Edgerton also thought that enforcement of
the covenant defeated its reason for being as Negroes would pay more for the property than
whites, and that the injunction was broader than the covenant since the covenant contained
no provision against use or occupancy. This he regarded as'reversible error. See Hundley v.
Gorewitz, 132 F. 2d 23 (App. D.C., 1942); Gospel Spreading Ass'n v. Bennetts, 147 F. 2d
878 (App. D.C., 1945). His dissent in this case was an elaboration of what he said in Mays v.
Burgess, 147 F. 2d 289 (App. D.C., x945).
'4 299

Fed. 899 (App. D.C., X926), appeal dismissed 272 U.S. 323 (1926).
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basis for appeal, it did no more than decide that the Constitution did not make
the covenant itself void. The Court thus necessarily left open the questions of
whether the covenant might be void either as against public policy, or as an
unlawful restraint on alienation. Moreover, according to this view, even if
covenants are valid on all of these grounds, whether their enforcement by injunction violates the Constitution, the Civil Rights Act, or principles of equity
2
could not be, and was not, decided in the Corrigan case. S
In arguing that enforcement of the covenant in the Hurd case would be
inequitable, Judge Edgerton said:
It is enough to point out that the familiar principle of "balancing equities" precludes
any injunction in this case because, in view of the present housing situation, the extreme hardship which injunctions will inflict upon the appellant greatly outweighs
any benefits which the appellees may possibly derive from them and that "especially
courts of equity, may appropriately withhold their aid when the plaintiff is using the
right asserted contrary to the public interest."'2
He then went on to discuss the effect of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Buchanan v. Warley7 on the constitutional question. The core of the

case, which had held a Louisville ordinance forbidding Negroes to move into
predominantly white blocks and whites to move into predominantly Negro
blocks unconstitutional, was that the constitutional rights of Negroes to buy
and use, and of whites to sell to Negroes, real property, may not be directly
interfered with by the government 8 He said:
The action that begins with the decree and ends with its enforcement is obviously
direct government action ..... Every case that holds legislation unconstitutional
holds in terms or in effect that its judicial enforcement would be unconstitutional.
....The Constitution does not exempt any kind of judicial action from the requirements of due process of law. Not only legislation and procedure but judicially adopted
rules of substantive law, including equity, are invalid when they conflict with these
requirements.29
2SBut the state and federal courts have constantly relied on the Corrigan case to hold restrictive convenants valid and enforceable by injunction. The Corrigan precedent is carefully
analyzed and state cases are collected and criticized in McGovney, op. cit. supra note x;
Kahen, Validity of Anti-Negro Restrictive Covenants, 12 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. x98, 200 (945);
Miller, Race Restrictions on Ownership or Occupancy of Land, 7 Lawyers Guild Rev. 99, io4
(1947). The recent cases, note x supra, have continued to rely on the Corrigan case. But see the
early case of Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. r8i (C.C. Cal., 1892) in which a restrictive covenant was held unenforceable as a violation of a treaty with China.
26 162 F. 2d 233, 237 (App. D.C., 1947).
27 245 U.S. 6o (r91).
28 Although the specific ground of decision was that the ordinance, in restraining the seller's
right of disposition, deprived him of property without due process of law, the court also said
that the occupancy, and necessarily the purchase and sale of property cannot be prohibited
solely because of the color of the proposed occupant. See McGovney, op. cit. supra note z;
Jones, Legality of Race Restrictive Housing Covenants, 4 Nat. Bar J. x4 (1945). Buchanan v.
Warley was followed in Harmon v. Taylor, 273 U.S. 668 (1927) and in City of Richmond v.
Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930).
29 162 F. 2d 233, 239-40 (App. D.C., 1947). See Judge Edgerton's dissent in Mays v. Burgess, 147 F. 2d 869 (App. D.C., 1945), and McGovney, op. cit. supra note i.
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Since the Civil Rights Cases, 30 .decided in 1883, it has been clear that the
Fourteenth Amendment is prohibitive of state action only. If judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants is construed as state action, for which there seems
to be considerable authority,31 then within the meaning of Buchananv. Warley,
when an injunction issues to prevent a willing buyer from taking and occupying
premises conveyed by a willing seller, it is arguable that there has been a
deprivation of due process of law.
In calling attention to the possible relevance of the Civil Rights Act, judge
Edgerton made an original contribution to the discussion of the covenant problem. He thought that "since the injunctions are based on covenants alone and
the covenants are based on color alone, ultimately the injunctions are based on
color alone."'32 Under this view any restriction imposed upon the right of colored
citizens to purchase and hold property not similarly imposed upon the right of
white citizens denies to the former "the same right .... as is enjoyed by white
citizens," and is, therefore, a violation of the Act.33 In dealing with the point of
restraint on alienation, he expressed satisfaction with the American Law Institute's restatement of the subject 34 and concluded that the covenant in the suit

was unreasonable and should have been held void. On the point of public policy
he adduced considerable data concerning the impoverished living conditions of
30 X09 U.S. 3 (1883); see United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); Virginia v.
Rives, oo U.S. 333 (188o); United States v. Harris, io6 U.S. 629 (1882). When legislative
authority is given for discrimination it is generally held to be a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).

31"The judicial act of the highest court of the State in authoritatively construing and
enforcing its laws is the act of the State." Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 9o-9i (iqo8);
"But it must be observed that the prohibitions of the [Fourteenth] Amendment refer to all the
instrumentalities of the State, to its legislative, executive, and judicial authorities, and, therefore, whoever by virtue of public position under a state government deprives another of any
right protected by that Amendment against deprivation by the state, 'violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name and for the state, and is clothed with the state's
power, his act is that of the state.' "Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (3913)
and cases cited therein; Iowa-Des Moines Bank v. Bennet, 284 U.S. 239 (1931) (action of state
court in sustaining unlawful collection of taxes held state action); American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 32 U.S. 323 (1941) (action of state court in construing its state law as limiting
peaceful picketing held state action); Bridges v. California, 334 U.S. 252 (3941) (construction
of contempt power by state court held state action); Brinkeroff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673
(3930); Raymond v. Chicago Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20 (i9o7); Bakery Driver's Union v.
Wohl, 335 U.S. 769 (942). And see McGovney, op. cit. supra note i; Kahen, op. cit. supra
note i.
12162 F. 2d 233, 241 (App. D.C., 1947).

33Ibid.

34 The American Law Institute lists six factors, which tend, when present, to make restraints on alienation reasonable and valid: "i) The one imposing the restraint has some interest in land which he is seeking to protect by the enforcement of the restraint; 2) the restraint
is limited in duration; 3) the enforcement of the restraint accomplishes a worthwhile purpose;
4) the type of conveyances prohibited are ones not likely to be employed to any substantial
degree by the one restrained; 5) the number of persons to whom alienation is prohibited is
small .... ; 6) the one upon whom the restraint is imposed is a charity." Rest., Property
§ 4o6 (x944).
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Negroes in the District of Columbia and throughout the country generally, 3
criticized the opinion of the court and its previous opinions for not taking
account of such facts, and sketched the implications of anti-Negro discrimination for the future of American democracy. He thought the United Nations
Charter could not "be neglected in any consideration of the public policy of
preventing men from buying homes because they are Negroes."36 He added:
Suits like this and the ghetto system they enforce, are among our conspicuous
failures to live together in peace ..... The question in these cases is not whether law
should punish racial discrimination, or even whether law should try to prevent racial
discrimination, or whether the law should interfere with it in any way. The question is
whether law should affirmatively support and enforce racial discrimination.37
In the second of the cases in which certiorari has been petitioned for but not
yet granted, lerkins v. Trustees of Monroe Avenue Church of Christ,3 the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld an injunction prohibiting the defendants from using
or occupying the Church premises they had purchased. The court denied that
there was any question of discrimination involved, saying: "White may exclude
black. Black may exclude white."3 9 The court argued that the use restrictions in
the covenant were comparable to building use restrictions, saying: "Would anyone gainsay that one alloting and selling property for strictly residential purposes might not legally write into conveyances for the benefit of the purchasers
and their assigns, a restrictive covenant against letting a property therein to be
occupied and used as a house of prostitution?"4o The court rationalized its decision on the basis of what appears to, be a rather curious conception of democracy:
We well recognize that vociferous minorities of our citizens, instigated by politicians, not statesmen, clamor for judicial denial of private rights under the guise of
public welfare which is to say public policy; but the courts ought to be and are ever
mindful of that basic thought which underlies representative democracy, "give all
power to the many and they will oppress the few, give all power to the few and they
will oppress the many, so that each should retain within themselves the power for
their own preservation."'4
3sThere

is abundant authoritative comment on the evils of racial segregation. "Segrega-

tion .... has kept the Negro-occupied sections of cities throughout the country fatally unwholesome places, a menace to health, morals and general decency of cities, and'plague spots
for race exploitation, friction and riots.'" 6 Report of The Committee on Negro Housing of
the President 45-46 (i932); and see Myrdal, An American Dilemma 378, 624-26; Weaver,
Racial Restrictive Housing Covenants, 3o J. Land & Pub. Util. Econ. x83, 185, I9o (1938).
36 162 F. 2d 233, 245 (App. D.C., 1947).
37 Ibid., at 246.
3870 N.E. 2d 487 (Ohio, 1946). The court invalidated that part of the injunction which prohibited sale. See Perkins v. Trustees of Monroe Avenue Church, 70 N.E. 487 (Ohio, z947).
39 Ibid., at 491.
40 Ibid. In other cases the rules in racial and building use restrictions have been regarded as
the same. Cases are collected ift Miller, op. cit. supra note 2.
4' 70 N.E. 2d 487, 492 (Ohio, 1946).
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The constitutional questions were disposed of on the authority of Corriganv.
Buckley, and the court rested its decision on freedom of contract, saying: "The
liberty of contract, being one of those rights secured by our constitution, is not
to be restrained upon an insufficient or mere fanciful conceit of what might
possibly happen."42
The Perkins case illustrates a continuing pattern, based on the earlier cases
and exemplified in Corrigan v. Buckley, whereby the issues are narrowed to include only the contractual rights of the parties to the action. Inasmuch as the
attack in the Corrigancase and in the other early cases was based on the theory
that the covenant was itself void, it was logical that the courts should stress the
contract problems and pay little heed to policy considerations.43 With the attempt made in the Sipes and Hurd cases to broaden the issue, to emphasize the
social results of enforcement, and to question the constitutionality of the
remedy of injunction, the courts have been given an opportunity to reconsider
what importance should be attached to the freedom of contract approach.
The Supreme Court has already considered an important question related to
this type of situation. In Marshv. Alabama4 the right of a member of Jehovah's
Witnesses to distribute religious literature on the streets of a town entirely
owned by a corporation was upheld. The Court said: "Since these facilities are
built and operated primarily to benefit the public and since their operation is
essentially a public function, it is subject to state regulation [and] the managers
appointed by the corporation cannot curtail the liberty of press and religion of
'' S
these people consistently with the purposes of the constitutional guarantees. 4
It has been suggested that if Marsh v. Alabama and Buchanan v. Warley are
considered together, in a case where the neighborhood restricted constitutes so
large a proportion of the community that enforcement results in the community
being zoned on a racial basis, the covenant is unenforceable as failing to satisfy
the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.46 But in neither the Sipes and
Kraemer cases, nor in the Hurd and Perkins cases, will the Supreme Court be
confronted with covenants covering substantial areas. In no one case, moreover
42Ibid.
43 For example: "The question is whether a contractual duty, knowingly and voluntarily
assumed may be enforced. If the contract is valid and enforceable, its wisdom is not a question for the court." Ridgway v. Cockburn, 296 N.Y.S. 936, 943 (N.Y., 1937). Similar language
is to be found in most of the cases cited note i supra.
44326 U.S. Soi (1946).
4 Ibid., at So6, 5o8.
46Tefft, Marsh v. Alabama-A Suggestion Concerning Racial Restrictive Housing Covenants, 4 Natl. B.J. 133, 134 (x946). In Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corporation, decided in the
Supreme Court of New York, N.Y. Times, § 3, P. 73, col. 5 (July 29, 1947) the court disregarded the rule in the Marsh case and refused to grant relief where plaintiffs sued to enjoin
the corporation from refusing to rent to them simply because they were Negroes. Stuyvesant
Town is a housing project accommodating 24,000 persons, and was made possible by numerous
grants and concessions from the City of New York. See N.Y. Development Companies Law
(McKinney, 1945) §§ 3401-26. It would appear that even if the project were entirely a private
venture, which it plainly is not, its very physical pattern as a town would bring its corporate
owners within the restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment as in the Marsh case.
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is it ever to be expected that the particular restricted area will comprise a very
large proportion of a city's total area. Nonetheless, the suggested approach is
still relevant since the cases most often arise in cities having a substantial Negro
population and in which all the restricted areas together constitute a specified
large proportion of the total.47 It seems that when a court considers only the
particular covenant in issue it is disregarding the fact that enforcement of one
covenant means enforcement of all like covenants, and as an agency of the
state48 it is actually enforcing a discriminatory situation by judicial decision
which Buchanan v. Warley bars the states from creating by legislation. Moreover, the value of this approach need not necessarily depend upon a specified
percentage of a city's area being restricted, for the same racial zoning result is
achieved where only that part of a city's area which immediately surrounds the
"black belt" or protects the more desirable residential districts of the city is
restricted.
The cases indicate that, on the whole, the new attacks on restrictive covenants so far have been met by a firm adherence to precedents originating in the
older types of attack. Although there is no showing of social data in the record in
either of the cases in which the Supreme Court has granted certiorari, if the
Court should consider the data and arguments in the amicus briefs in Sipes v.
McGhee or grant certiorari, in Hurd v. Hodge, it will have before it a complete
presentation of the attacks on restrictive covenants. The weight of precedent in
the state courts and the improbability of direct legislation outlawing covenants
make it evident that the Supreme Court in granting certiorari affords, perhaps,
the major hope of ameliorating one of the most critical areas of racial tension in
contemporary American life.49

RECENT APPLICATIONS OF THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL
CONTEMPT DISTINCTION
The distinction between civil and criminal contempt, always troublesome,
played an important part in United States v. United Mine Workers," where the
Supreme Court approved the procedure used by the District Court in imposing
a fine combining both civil and criminal elements in a single contempt proceeding. Mr. Justice Rutledge, in his dissent in the Mine Workers case2 and again in
47 For example: "The exact extent of the restrictive covenant has not been ascertained, but
'in Chicago it has been estimated that 8o% of the city is covered by such agreements .....
Myrdal, op. cit. supra note 35, at 624.
.48Authorities cited note 31 supra.
49What the Supreme Court will decide is conjectural, but if it should decide only that injunctions in such cases are unconstitutional, without determi ing that restrictive covenants are
themselves void, the question of damages might become prominent. It is the remedy of enforcement by injunction, however, that effectively and necessarily prevents Negroes from acquiring restricted property.

1 67 S. Ct. 677 (1947)-

2 67 S. Ct. 677, 7u
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